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NOTE AND COMMENT
is not clear, and the court is split 3-2 on an important statute,
may result in a contrary holding in a case similar in facts. It
would seem appropriate for our legislature to remove the neces-
sity of speculating as to its intention by amending our in-
heritance tax statutes. The Federal estate tax rule' could be
used as a pattern for our inheritance tax on jointly owned
property. There are obvious administrative advantages to
paralleling the federal rule. We would fall heir to the federal
cases interpreting that statute, and it would give us an equita-
ble rule. With our present statutes, as applied in the Perier
case, a property owner has nothing to gain and much to lose
by holding property in joint tenancy.
Sidney P. Kurth.
'Internal Revenue Code, §811. The value of the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his
death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever
situated, except real property situated outside of the United States.
(e) Joint interests.-To the extent of the interest therein held as joint
tenants by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the
entirety by the decedent and spouse, or deposited, with any person
carrying on the banking business, in their joint names and payable to
either or the survivor, except such part thereof as may be shown to
have originally belonged to such other person and never to have been
received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth: Provided,
That where such property or any part thereof, or part of the con-
sideration with which such property was acquired, is shown to have
been at any time acquired by such other person from the decedent for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, there shall be excepted only such part of the value of such
property as is proportionate to the consideration furnished by such
other person: Provided further, That where any property has been
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, as a tenancy by the
entirety by the decedent and spouse, then to the extent of one-half
of the value thereof, or, where so acquired by the decedent and any
other person as joint tenants and their interests are not otherwise
specified or fixed by law, then to the extent of the value of a frac-
tional part to be determined by dividing the value of the property by
the number of joint tenants.
ANIMALS AT LARGE ON THE HIGHWAY
A dearth of Supreme Court decisions exists in Montana
on the relative rights of drivers of automobiles and of owners
of livestock involved in collisions on the highway, nor are there
any Montana statutes directly in point. Consideration is here
given to Montana statutes relating to trespassing animals and
to decisions in other jurisdictions regarding animals on high-
ways as well as to Montana decisions on related matters to in-
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dicate the probable course which would be followed by the
Montana Supreme Court.
The term "animals running at large" is intended to mean
animals which are not under the immediate control of any per-
son but which are not expressly prohibited to be allowed to run
at large by any statute.
The owner of domestic animals is by the common law
under an absolute duty to keep them restrained on his own
premises and is liable for their trespasses on another's land if
he does not.' T~his liability is absolute and depends in no meas-
ure on negligence. It applies, of course, only to domestic ani-
mals roaming at large and not to those being herded. Gen-
erally, this rule has been recognized or adopted in the more
densely populated parts of the country where agriculture pre-
dominates and rejected in those parts of the country where
population is scattered and grazing predominates.
Montana has adopted what is popularly known as "Range
Law. ' I
"If any cattle, horse, mule, ass, hog, sheep or other do-
mestic animal break into any inclosure, the fence being
legal, the owner of such animal is liable for all damages
to the owner or occupant of the enclosure which may be
sustained thereby."'
Judicial interpretation of this statute indicates that a law-
ful fence entirely surrounding the premises or some obstruc-
tion equivalent thereto is a condition precedent to the right
to bring an action against trespassing animals.'
Since it is evident that range law which prevails in Mon-
tana is the direct opposite of the common law regarding tres-
passing animals, the question naturally arises whether the dif-
ference is reflected in liability for highway collisions involv-
ing animals at large.
At common law an owner of a domestic animal is under
no legal obligation to restrain it from being at large on the
highway unattended unless he has knowledge of vicious pro-
pensities of the animal, and he is not liable for an injury re-
sulting from its being so at large unless he should reasonably
'Klenberg v. Russell (1890) 125 Ind. 531, 25 N.E. 596; Stone v. Kopka
(1884) 100 Ind. 458; Adams Bros. v. Clark (1920) 189 Ky. 279, 224
S.W. 1046; Fox v. Koehnig (1926) 190 Wise. 528, 209 N.W. 708; 3
C.J.S. Animals 185.
'R.C.M. 1935, §3378.
8Smith v. Williams (1874) 2 Mont. 195, 201.
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have anticipated that injury would result therefrom.' This
does not contradict the previously stated common law rule
regarding absolute liability for trespass of animals on an-
other's land since the liability entailed in the latter rule is
only for damage to another's land; i.e., eating, or trampling
down grass; and all owners of livestock may be held to have
knowledge of the natural propensity of their stock to eat or
trample down grass. The duty of the livestock owner to keep
his animals restrained is owed to all landowners on whose
land the animals may trespass.
As has been seen above, the common law as to trespass
has been changed by statute in Montana, but "a statute is not
presumed to work any changes in the rule of the common law
beyond what is expressed in its provisions or fairly implied
in them in order to give them full operation. " So, regard-
ing the legal status of animals at large on the highway in
Montana where range law exists as to trespass the presump-
tion is that the common law would apply; viz, no legal obliga-
tion on the part of the owner to keep them off the highway.
Under this rule liability of the stock owner to a motorist in-
jured in a collision with animals on the highway is predicated
on the ordinary rules of negligence.
R.C.M. 1935, See. 3384 provides for creation of herd dis-
tricts contiguous to cities having a population of 10,000 or
more with a suburban population of not less than 200 people.
R.C.M. 1935, Sec. 3385 provides the owner of any horses,
mules, cattle, sheep or goats who wilfully permits them to run
at large within a herd district shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. So, animals roaming at large on a highway within
a herd district in Montana are apparently illegally there, and
their owner is guilty of negligence since he owes a duty to the
public to keep his animals confined. In Strait v. Bartholomew"
the court held that owners of stock in a stock or herd district
must exercise reasonable care in maintaining fences and must
adopt such other means as are reasonably necessary to prevent
their stock from straying on the highway.
In the sections of Montana where herd districts have not
been created it cannot be held that the owner of animals is
negligent merely because his animals are at large on the high-
way regardless of whether he knew of their presence there. The
'Animals at Large in Highway, 140 A.L.R. 742 (1942).
5Forrester v. B. & M. Mining Co., (1898) 21 Mont. 544, 55 P. 229, 353.
a(1923) 195 Iowa 377, 191 N.W. 811.
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negligence of a driver colliding with an animal loose on a pub-
lic highway should be tested by the rule of due care under the
circumstances.' The fact that a motorist ran into an animal
which was in plain view on a public highway where there was
ample room for safe passing has been held to be a lack of due
care on the part of the operator of the motor vehicle." But where
the animal dashed in front of the car without warning, the mo-
torist was held not liable.'
Although under range law a stock owner is not negligent
by virtue of violating a law prohibiting animals at large on the
highway, there is evidence that his negligence may be predicated
on his failure to keep his animals off the highway when he could
foresee an accident as a result of their presence thereon. The
court in Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Gordon said that one in
possession of an animal is without the right to permit it to be on
a public highway unattended if he should have reasonably anti-
cipated that injury would be there inflicted by the animal.'
Since the collisions involved in all these cases occurred at night,
it is questionable whether the stock owner would be held to the
same degree of foreseeability had they occurred in the day time.
In Louisiana there is no general statute prohibiting owners
from allowing their cattle to roam at large, but parishes may
at their discretion adopt local ordinances prohibiting this prac-
tice. In Boudreau v. Louviere' defendant's mule was on the
highway and caused plaintiff to be injured. The court held de-
fendant liable because a local ordinance prohibited owners from
permitting their stock to run at large. However, in Abrahams
v. Castille' where a similar ordinance has been enacted it was
held the owner was not at fault when, due to an "Act of God"
or other unforeseeable agency, his animal escapes from a fenced
close and runs onto the highway where it causes damage. In
Demarco v. Gober" the court in a decision reversing a lower
court's decision against the owner of a mule killed on a highway
'Rivers v. Pierce (1940) 106 Colo. 236, 103 P.(2d) 690; Texeira v.
Sundquist (1934) 288 Mass. 93, 192 N.E. 611.8Pulam v. Moore (1920) 204 Mo. App. 697, 218 S.W. 938.
'IDemarco v. Gober (1932) 19 La. App. 236, 140 So. 64.
'0(1939) 184 Miss. 885, 186 So. 631.
uLins v. Boeckeler Lumber Co. (1927) 221 Mo. App. 181, 299 S.W. 150;
Schindler v. Mulhair (1937) 132 Neb. 809, 273 N.W. 217; Trail v. Oster-
meier (1941) 140 Neb. 432, 300 N.W. 375; Drew v. Gross (1925) 112
Ohio St. 485, 147 N.E. 767; Smith v. Whitlock (1942) ...... W. Va .......
19 S.E. (2d) 617.
"(1938) ...... La ....... , 178 So. 173.
'(1935) ...... La ........ 158 So. 650.
"Note 9, supra.
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and granting recovery to the owner of the car involved in the
accident said:
"There is no evidence whatsoever showing that mules,
horses or cattle are prohibited by ordinance of the police
jury or other authority from roaming at large on the high-
ways of the parish in which the accident occurred. Plain-
tiff cannot, therefore, be held to have been at fault be-
cause his mule on that occasion had gone on that high-
way."
In Dunckelman v. &chockly" an action was brought for the
value of two horses killed in a collision with defendant's truck.
The accident took place in a parish where it is lawful for stock
to run at large, but nevertheless, recovery was denied the
plaintiff because he failed to prove negligence on the part of
the defendant.
Within a herd district the owner of livestock would be
negligent in allowing his livestock to wander on the highway.
The question may be raised as to the applicability of the Last
Clear Chance Doctrine. As to whether this can be pleaded in
cases involving property damage alone, the following is quoted
from a note on the Last Clear Chance Doctrine in 92 A.L.R. 55
(1935):
"Although the doctrine is most frequently invoked in
cases involving personal injury and its applicability to
property damage has sometimes been questioned, its ap-
plicability to support recovery for damage to property
in a proper case has been expressly affirmed in some
cases and assumed in many others.' After all, the don-
key whose demise was the occasion of the decision in
Davies v. Mann' and a contributing cause at least of the
perplexities incident to the doctrine sponsored by that
case was a chattel and not a person."
The English court in Davies v. Mane held that since the
defendant did not deny that the donkey was lawfully in the
highway, the court must assume that it was lawfully there, but
"even were it otherwise, it would have made no difference for
as the defendant might by proper care have avoided injuring
the animal and did not he is liable for the consequences of
0(1938) ...... La ...... 183 So. 52.
*West Construction Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (1923) 185 N.C.
43, 116 S.E. 3; Morgan v. Missouri K. & T. P. Co. (1917) 108 Tex. 331,
193 S.W. 134.
-(1842) 10 M. & W. 546.
,Io.
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his negligence, though the animal may have been improperly
there."
Dahmer v. N. P. R. R. Co., a leading cas6 on the Montana
doctrine, holds that allegation and proof of three propositions
are essential to recovery under the Last Clear Chance; i.e.,
(1) the exposed condition brought about by negligence of the
person injured, (2) actual discovery by defendant of perilous
situation of the person, and (3) defendant's failure to there-
after use ordinary care to avert the injury. In Pollard v.
Oregon Short Line' plaintiff sued for personal injuries re-
ceived when defendant's train struck plaintiff's car stalled
on defendant's track. Plaintiff at the time was attempting
to repair the truck so that he could move it from the tracks.
ThO appellate court in their decision said that while many
courts require allegation and proof of "actual discovery" in
crossing cases, the better view with reference to crossings-as
distinguished from injuries to trespassers and bare licensees
upon railroad tracks at places where they have no right to be
-is that the servants of the railroad are bound to keep a
lookout at crossings; and the railroad company will be liable
for running over them if, by maintaining such a lookout and
by using reasonable care and exertion to check or stop its
train, it oculd avoid injuring them. Although this case shows
a disposition on the part of the Montana courts to depart
from the earlier doctrine of actual discovery, the case is not
conclusive since the court found that actual discovery could
be proved in this case by circumstantial evidence. However,
even though the doctrine of undiscovered peril should become
law in Montana, it is questionable whether stock owners who
allow their animals to run at large within, a herd district
could recover under the Last Clear Chance since the animals
are wrongfully on the highway. Is the motorist obliged to
keep a lookout for animals wrongfully on the highway? In
Frowd v. Marchbank' the driver of a car who kept on driving
though vision of the highway was obscured by lights from a
passing car and who thereafter collided with cattle which had
been permitted to run loose on the highway at dusk unaccom-
panied by any person was held not properly chargeable with
negligence under the Last Clear Chance Doctrine in an action
by a farmer as owner of the cattle for damages, inasmuch as
'(1913) 48 Mont. 152, 136 P. 1059, 142 P. 209.
2(1932) 92 Mont. 119, 11 P. (2d) 271.
2(1929) Wash. 283 P. 467.
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the driver had no reason to suspect the presence of cows on
the highway uncontrolled by any person, in violation of a
statute. A Wisconsin court' in 1941 in deciding a case with
substantially the same facts held there was no duty on the
part of the motorist to keep a lookout since he had no reason
to suspect a horse on the highway at night. From the doctrine
laid down in these two cases it would seem the motorist owes
a duty to keep a lookout for only such objects as he may sus-
pect would be in the highway and that he cannot be held to
suspect animals in the highway in violation of a statute. Where
range law prevails, the animals are rightfully on the highway,
and consequently under the rule indicated in the Pollard case,
the motorist would be liable if he "should have discovered" the
animals. In Armstrong v. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co."
the doctrine of undiscovered peril as expressed in the Restate-
ment of the Law of Tort? is quoted verbatim in dictum. How-
ever, there has never been a Montana case decided in plaintiff's
favor on appeal on the doctrine of undiscovered peril. So, on
the decisions thus far, it might, therefore, be argued that actual
discovery of the animals on the highway would be necessary, be-
fore the negligent motorist could be held liable against the
negligent stock owner in Montana.
A California court in 1941 indicates what seems to be the
trend of the law regarding animals on the highway. Plaintiff's
automobile, which was proceeding at night at the rate of 45
miles per hour with headlights on ovei a highway running
through hilly, open range country belonging to the United
States, collided with a cow belonging to defendant, which ap-
parently was crossing the road after leaving a creek to get to
the other side of the road to feeding grounds. The highway
was unfenced and well-traveled. It was the custom of cattle
owners to allow their stock to range at will unattended, and
plaintiff was familiar with the country and had seen cattle
alongside the road but had never seen them at night. The
court found no contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff. In rendering a decision for the plaintiff, the court said:
"We may assume at common law appellants were under
no duty to keep their cattle off the highway. However,
there are common sense limitations on the application
mOtt v. Tschantz (1941) 239 Wis. 47, 300 N.W. 766.
'(1940) 110 Mont. 133, 99 P.(2d) 223.
RMEsTATEMENT, TORTS, §479.t Galeppi Bros. v. Bartlett CCA 9th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 208 affirming
(DC, 1940) 33 F. Supp. 277.
7
Murphy: Animals at Large on the Highway
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1949
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
of such a rule. The common law rule was adopted when
there was no elaborate system of highways and no motor
vehicles. There was then no such reason for imposing
on cattle owners a duty of using ordinary care in the
care and control of cattle. Now the changed conditions
compel adoption of a different rule. There is no reason
for exempting cattle owners from the same duty appli-
cable to other people to use ordinary care or skill in the
management of their property."
It is questionable whether Montana would accept this Cali-
fornia doctrine, as yet, since highways in Montana, except for
those embraced in the herd districts, are not so heavily traveled
as those in California, and furthermore, the courts would prob-
ably consider the necessity for encouraging stock raising in the
state, this being one of our principal industries.
Helen Murphy.
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